Password brute force

Telnet's cleartext login is brute-forceable, and the devices that run it often apply no lockout or rate limiting, so guessing is practical. Because capture is easier, sniffing a cleartext login beats guessing where a position exists, but brute force with device-appropriate wordlists remains effective against exposed Telnet.

1 min di letturaaggiornato il 5 ott 2026florianamette1 contributore
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Telnet logins can be targeted by online password guessing, and some equipment applies little account lockout or rate limiting. Device-appropriate wordlists are more relevant than generic lists, especially when paired with a username documented for the identified model. If the session remains plaintext and a capture position exists, sniffing a real login (password sniffing) is quieter and more reliable than guessing.

bash
hydra -l admin -P passwords.txt telnet://<target> -t 4 -f
hydra -L users.txt -P iot-passwords.txt telnet://<target> -t 4
nmap -p23 --script telnet-brute --script-args userdb=u.txt,passdb=p.txt <target>

Exploitation notes#

  • Tune the wordlist to the device: IoT/router default-and-common lists outperform generic human-password lists against embedded Telnet, and pair them with the device's default username.
  • Many Telnet devices lack lockout, so brute force that would lock a normal account can run freely; still keep threads modest to avoid overwhelming flimsy device stacks (some crash).
  • Prefer capture over guessing when on-path: a cleartext login sniff yields the exact credential with no attempts logged, see password sniffing.
  • A hit is typically administrative on the device and often reused; test it elsewhere.

Tools#

References#