Kubernetes

Attacking Kubernetes end to end: enumerating the cluster from a compromised pod, reaching exposed components, escalating through RBAC and service-account tokens, escaping a pod to its node, moving between workloads and into the cloud, and persisting in the cluster.

2 ನಿಮಿಷದ ಓದುಅಕ್ಟೋ 5,2026 ರಂದು ನವೀಕರಿಸಲಾಗಿದೆflorianamette1 ಕೊಡುಗೆದಾರ
ನಿಮ್ಮ ಸಹಾಯಕವನ್ನು ಕೇಳಿ (MCP)GitHub ನಲ್ಲಿ ಸಂಪಾದಿಸಿ

Most Kubernetes attacks start from a single compromised pod and climb. A pod carries an identity (a service-account token), sits on a flat network, and runs on a node that holds credentials for the whole cluster. The path is familiar: enumerate, reach exposed components, escalate through RBAC, escape to the node, move laterally, and persist. Escaping the pod to its node uses the runtime-agnostic primitives in Container escape; this area is the cluster-level attack model around them.

First moves from a pod#

These few commands decide which branch of the area applies next:

bash
# 1. identity and what it can do (drives the RBAC and lateral branches)
T=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
echo "$T" | cut -d. -f2 | base64 -d 2>/dev/null | python3 -m json.tool   # whoami
kubectl --token="$T" --certificate-authority=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt \
  --server=https://$KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST:$KUBERNETES_SERVICE_PORT auth can-i --list

# 2. am I in an over-privileged pod? (drives pod-escape-to-node)
grep -E 'CapEff|Seccomp' /proc/self/status; cat /proc/self/uid_map
mount | grep -vE 'overlay|proc|sysfs|tmpfs|cgroup' | head   # hostPath

# 3. what is reachable? (drives exposed-components, network, cloud)
curl -sk https://$KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST/version
curl -s http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ 2>/dev/null | head   # cloud metadata

Read the results: broad can-i output points at RBAC privilege escalation; a privileged or host-mounting pod points at Pod escape to node; a reachable kubelet, etcd, or dashboard points at Exposed components; a reachable metadata endpoint points at the cloud, via Cloud metadata from pod.

Subtopics#

References#