VPN authentication usually validates against the corporate directory, so the SSL-VPN portal and IKE XAUTH are high-value targets for password spraying and credential stuffing: a single working password is a tunnel into the internal network, and because the VPN often is the perimeter, that is deep access. Spraying one common password across many users avoids lockout and finds weak accounts; stuffing replays breached and infostealer-sourced credentials, which hit because VPN logins reuse the same passwords as everything else. MFA, where enforced, is the remaining barrier (and is sometimes bypassable or not applied to all auth paths).
# SSL-VPN portal spraying (product-specific login endpoint)
# generic HTTP-POST form spray with a lockout-safe single password across users:
hydra -L users.txt -p 'Spring2025!' <target> https-post-form \
"/remote/logincheck:username=^USER^&credential=^PASS^:<fail-string>"
# IKE XAUTH credential attack (after PSK/main-mode)
# learn the lockout policy and spray below it; stuff breached pairs 1:1
Exploitation notes#
- Spray one password across validated users to stay under lockout, and stuff breached/infostealer pairs separately; VPN portals are a top stuffing target because they accept reused corporate credentials.
- Derive usernames and the password policy from other enumeration (the directory, OSINT, portal error differences); match the username format the portal expects (UPN,
DOMAIN\user, or bare). - The login endpoint and failure signal are product-specific (FortiGate
/remote/logincheck, others differ); fingerprint the appliance first, see banner grabbing. - A valid password establishes one accepted factor. Confirm MFA, device-posture, group, and route policy before reporting tunnel access; assess legacy paths and appliance exploits separately.