Handlers and web.config | Cyber Library

IIS maps request extensions to handlers (the ASP.NET pipeline, the static file handler, CGI/FastCGI) and reads a per-directory web.config that can change those mappings. Misconfigurations here execute uploads, disclose source, or let an attacker reconfigure a directory they can write to.

Handler mapping and upload execution#

If a directory that accepts uploads is served by a handler that executes the uploaded extension, the upload is RCE. The IIS-specific extensions to get past denylists include:

code

shell.aspx   shell.asp   shell.ashx   shell.asmx   shell.cer   shell.soap

.cer and .asa/.asax have historically been mapped to executing handlers on misconfigured servers. Combine with the NTFS filename tricks (shell.aspx;.jpg, trailing dot) to slip an executable extension past an upload filter while IIS still runs it. The ; semicolon trick (file.asp;.jpg) made older IIS execute the part before the semicolon.

web.config as an execution vector#

web.config is read per directory. Where uploads land in a directory without a parent lock and the application does not block it, uploading a crafted web.config can:

register a handler that executes a benign extension in that directory, or
define an ASP-classic block or an httpHandlers/handlers entry that runs code,
and in some setups the web.config itself executes server-side includes or expression syntax when processed.

This turns "upload any file" into RCE even when script extensions are blocked, analogous to the Apache .htaccess upload.

Source disclosure#

Request executable scripts via ::$DATA / trailing dot (see NTFS filename tricks) to get raw source instead of execution.
A directory where the ASP.NET handler is not wired (static-file handler serving .aspx) returns source; this appears after misconfigured deployments or when a handler is removed.
web.config itself, if served as static content (handler misconfigured), discloses connection strings, machine keys, and handler layout. A leaked machineKey enables ViewState forgery.

Exploitation#

Fuzz uploads with IIS executable extensions plus filename tricks; confirm execution with a benign marker.
Where uploads allow it, try planting a web.config to remap or execute.
Probe known .aspx/.asmx for ::$DATA source, and request /web.config (and ::$DATA) for config disclosure and the machine key.

Tools#

Burp (upload fuzzing); IIS-ShortName-Scanner to find hidden scripts; content-discovery tooling.

References#

Microsoft IIS: handler mappings, web.config, request filtering
OWASP: Unrestricted file upload