Cognito

Abusing Amazon Cognito: unauthenticated identity-pool role assumption, user-pool self-signup and attribute abuse, and forged or elevated token claims.

1 phút đọccập nhật 7 thg 10, 2026florianamette1 người đóng góp
Hỏi trợ lý của bạn (MCP)Sửa trên GitHub

Amazon Cognito is the consumer identity service behind many web and mobile apps, and it bridges application users to real IAM credentials. That bridge is the attack surface: a misconfigured identity pool hands AWS credentials to anonymous callers, and an open user pool lets anyone enroll.

Pages#

  • Identity pool: exchanging an unauthenticated or guest identity for the pool's IAM role credentials.
  • User pool: open self-signup and writable attributes to gain or elevate access.
  • Token claims: abusing ID and access token claims to assume a more privileged identity.

The fastest unauthenticated check is the identity-pool flow: aws cognito-identity get-id for a pool id, then get-credentials-for-identity, which hands back IAM credentials when the pool grants an unauthenticated role (see identity pool).

Tools#

  • cognito-scanner (pip install cognito-scanner): unwanted account creation, the account-existence oracle, and identity-pool credential escalation in one scanner.
  • AWS CLI (cognito-identity, cognito-idp): the raw get-id / get-credentials-for-identity and sign-up / initiate-auth flows.

References#