Weak cryptography

SSH negotiates its cipher, MAC, and key-exchange algorithms, and a server that still offers weak ones, legacy ciphers, MD5-based or truncated MACs, small Diffie-Hellman groups, lets a positioned attacker select or downgrade to a breakable session. These weaknesses enable decryption or tampering of traffic an attacker can capture or relay.

1 phút đọccập nhật 7 thg 10, 2026florianamette1 người đóng góp
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SSH begins each session by negotiating algorithms for key exchange, encryption, and message authentication from the lists both sides offer. If a server still advertises weak options, the negotiation (or a positioned attacker forcing it) can land on a breakable combination: legacy or broken ciphers, weak or truncated MACs, and small or flawed key-exchange groups. These do not matter against a passive observer of a strong session, but they enable decryption, tampering, or downgrade for an attacker who can capture or sit on the connection, and they are the enabling weakness behind some SSH machine-in-the-middle and traffic attacks.

bash
# enumerate offered algorithms and grade them
nmap -p22 --script ssh2-enum-algos <target>
ssh -Q cipher; ssh -Q mac; ssh -Q kex          # what your client supports (for comparison)
# connect forcing a weak algorithm to test acceptance
ssh -c aes128-cbc -o MACs=hmac-md5 user@<target>

Subtopics#

  • Legacy key exchange: identifying accepted weak or small groups without confusing client-selected negotiation with an active downgrade.
  • Weak ciphers: legacy and CBC-mode cipher weaknesses.
  • Weak MAC algorithms: broken or truncated integrity protection.

References#